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Abstract 
Accounting standards mandate different, more conservative, rules for the recognition 
of unrealized gains than unrealized losses in reported earnings.  Conditional 
conservatism, defined as asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of unrealized losses vs. 
gains in reported earnings has, since its origins, been a peculiar characteristic of the 
accounting system.  Understanding conservatism’s role, its determinants, and its 
variations across firms is important for interpreting the nature, purposes, and valuation 
implications of accounting.  Basu (1995; 1997) proposed a model to detect accounting 
conditional conservatism and provided empirical evidence that bad news is recognized 
more quickly than good news in earnings for a sample over the period 1963-1991.  
Following his seminal work1, accounting literature adopted the Basu single-period model 
to measure conditional conservatism (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2005; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Lobo and Zhou 2006).   
However, Basu’s proxy for measuring the arrival of good/bad news, the price of the 
firm’s stock, may be influenced, in part, by factors that will never be recorded in a firm’s 
reported earnings.  This introduces inaccuracy in the measure of conditional 
conservatism.  To address the problems, I introduce a new measure of conditional 
conservatism, which results from a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression 
and adopts the number of changes in financial analysts’ EPS forecasts as a proxy for 
good/bad news.  Then, I use this new measure to test the determinants, suggested by 
previous literature, of conditional conservatism in accounting.  Results show that 
companies with (1) lower debt-to-assets ratio, (2) large proportion of executives’ annual 
                                                 
1 As of December 7, 2006, 102 citations for Basu (1997) are recorded on Thomson ISI’s Social Sciences 
Citation Index (http://portal.isiknowledge.com) and 291 are on Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com)  
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compensation independent of the firm’s accounting performance, (3) one of the big 4/big 
7 audit firms as auditor, and a auditor opinion qualified with a going concern assumption 
the previous year exhibit a greater timeliness in the recognition of bad news than good 
news in annual earnings.  
 
 
 vi
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction..................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Conditional Conservatism in Accounting....................................................................... 6 
2.1 Conservatism Determinants...................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Empirical Approaches .............................................................................................. 7 
2.3 Theoretical Approaches.......................................................................................... 17 
2.4 Problem with Using Market Returns as Proxy for Good/Bad News and My 
Adoption of Number of Analysts’ EPS Estimate Revisions as a Replacement Proxy... 18 
3. Model and Hypotheses.................................................................................................. 24 
3.1 Analysts’ Forecast Revisions as a Proxy for Good/Bad News ............................... 25 
3.2 Conditional Conservatism Determinants................................................................ 27 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics................................................................................. 30 
5. Research Design and Empirical Results ....................................................................... 33 
5.1 Hypothesis 1............................................................................................................ 33 
5.2 Hypothesis 2............................................................................................................ 35 
5.3 Hypothesis 3............................................................................................................ 37 
5.4 Hypothesis 4............................................................................................................ 40 
6. Sensitivity Checks......................................................................................................... 46 
6.1 Fiscal Year Return .................................................................................................. 46 
6.2 Fama-Macbeth Regression ..................................................................................... 46 
6.3 Change in the Cut-off Point to Create the Dummy Variable.................................. 47 
7. Conclusion and Future Research .................................................................................. 48 
7.1 Future Research...................................................................................................... 49 
List of References ............................................................................................................. 51 
Appendix........................................................................................................................... 58 
Vita.................................................................................................................................... 71 
 
 vii
List of Tables 
Table 1 Panel A Summary Statistics................................................................................. 59 
Table 1 Panel B Correlation Table.................................................................................... 60 
Table 2 Hypothesis 1 ........................................................................................................ 61 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel A Low Leverage Group Mean Lev=0.0158......................... 62 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel B High Leverage Group  Mean Lev=0.5042 ....................... 62 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel C Method b) ......................................................................... 64 
Table 4 Hypothesis 3 ........................................................................................................ 65 
Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel A Audit opinion ................................................................... 66 
Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel B Auditors’ Going Concern Opinion................................... 68 
Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel C Big7 .................................................................................. 69 
Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel D Auditors from Compustat DATA149................................ 70 
 
 viii
1. Introduction 
The conservative principle, defined as the more timely recognition of unrealized 
losses vs. gains in annual earnings, has characterized for centuries the practice of 
accounting reporting.  Despite its widespread adoption over time and over different 
countries, however, the concept is somewhat counter-intuitive.  Why do we have rules 
mandating the prompt recognition of expected losses, but delay the recognition of gains 
until they are (1) realized or realizable and (2) earned2?  Instead, would not a timely 
recognition of all the available news be more informative to users of financial statements, 
and thus preferred?  Indeed, recently the US Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB), jointly with the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), stated: 
Neutrality is incompatible with conservatism, which implies a bias in financial 
reporting information. Neutral information does not color the image it 
communicates to influence behavior in a particular direction. For example, 
automobiles might be produced with speedometers that indicate a higher speed than 
the automobile actually is traveling at to influence drivers to obey the speed limit. 
But those “conservative” speedometers would be unacceptable to drivers who 
expect them to faithfully represent the speed of the automobile. Conservative or 
otherwise biased financial reporting information is equally unacceptable. (FASB, 
Preliminary Views, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of 
Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financial 
Reporting Information, July 6, 2006, No. 1260-001, p. 29) 
 
This issue has been the basis for recent academic research (Guay 2006; Watts 2003a, 
2003b; Ryan 2006; Roychowdhury and Watts 2006; LaFond and Watts 2006; Choi et al. 
2006; Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006) because the 
understanding of the motivations and the determinants of conditional conservatism is 
important to gain insights on the role of financial reporting in debt contracting, 
managerial compensation, valuation, and institutional settings.  As an example, we can 
consider the debt contracting situation.  Shareholders have limited liability, which gives 
                                                 
2 FASB Concept Statement No. 5.  
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them incentives to transfer a company’s wealth to themselves in the form of dividends, 
leaving the company as an empty legal entity to debt-holders.  To avoid this, debt 
covenants link the maximum amount of dividends that can be distributed to reported 
earnings.  Requiring a less timely recognition of good news and more timely recognition 
of bad news in the firm’s annual reported earnings guarantees the debt-holders that a 
minimum level of resources is kept inside the company, and is available for distribution 
in case of a firm’s liquidation.   
Researchers have found evidence of conditional conservatism among US and 
international companies, and have suggested that conservatism is adopted in accounting 
because it benefits the agents that use, prepare, or regulate accounting reporting.  
Consequently, understanding the determinants and the institutional factors that shape the 
financial reporting process is fundamental to reading and interpreting a firm’s annual 
financial statements, the output of this process.  But many important questions remain 
unanswered and more empirical issues need to be addressed.  Has the analysis of 
conditional conservatism been exhaustive in identifying all the factors that might explain 
its widespread adoption?   An investigation of the accuracy of the measures commonly 
used in identifying the determinants of conservatism is vital in considering the reliability 
of research results.   
Indeed, because it is not possible to observe and track each single piece of 
information about a company’s future gains and losses, researchers need to identify an 
observable variable that can be adopted to indirectly measure a firm’s news to test for the 
timeliness of reporting good versus bad news in annual earnings.  Accounting 
researchers, following Basu’s seminal work (1997; 1995), adopted the market price of the 
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firm’s stock as a variable to measure good vs. bad news about the firm’s future earnings.  
The use of this measure, however, has raised a number of economic and econometric 
issues (Dietrich et al. 2006).  The stock price varies, in part, due to certain factors that 
will have a chance to be recognized in future earnings (accounting information). 
However, stock prices may also vary due to factors that will not be recognized in 
earnings over the years (non-accounting information).  Thus, stock prices, despite being a 
rather accurate measure of information about future cash flow, provide an inaccurate 
measure of the amount and significance of current information about the firm’s 
unrealized earnings that will be recognized in the future.  This introduces noise in the 
measure of asymmetric timeliness, hence in the measure of conditional conservatism. 
Therefore, I introduce a new, a priori more precise measure of asymmetric 
timeliness, combining a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression with the 
number of revisions in the financial analysts’ estimates of earnings per share (EPS) as a 
new variable to capture the arrival of good and bad “accounting3” news about the firm’s 
future earnings.  Financial analysts gather all available information, but use only the part 
that they believe will have a chance to be recognized in future earnings to revise their 
EPS estimates.4 (Nichols and Wahlen 2004).  This variable, I believe, is a more 
reasonable proxy for the arrival of good/bad news about future earnings than returns to 
investors, because it includes only the pieces of information that have a chance to be 
recognized in annual earnings over the years.  This variable should help to measure more 
                                                 
3 In the sense that these pieces of information will be, over time, recognized in the firm’s annual earnings. 
4 I adopt here the three theoretical links between earnings the three theoretical links between earnings and 
share prices developed by Beaver (1998): current period earnings provides information to predict future 
periods’ earnings, which provide information to forecast dividends in future periods, which provide 
information to determine stock prices, equal to the present value of future dividends.  
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precisely whether there is a difference in how quickly good and bad news are reported in 
annual earnings, hence the presence and the strength of conditional conservatism.  
Once I demonstrate that this measure of asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of 
good/bad news about future earnings is, a priori, less noisy (thus more precise), I can test 
whether determinants suggested by previous literature-, managerial, debt contracting, and 
auditor’s choice-are still able to explain the reasons for conditional conservatism.  I test 
(1) whether companies with a higher debt-to-asset ratio, where bondholders detain more 
power, are characterized by higher conditional conservatism.  Next, I test (2) whether 
companies in which executives’ compensation is more heavily based on firms’ 
accounting performances are characterized by higher conditional conservatism.  Finally, I 
test (3) if there is an association between auditors, auditor opinions, and the company’s 
lagged conditional conservatism.  
The results of the dissertation show that (1) companies characterized by a high debt-
to-asset ratio, contrary to expectations, recognize good news about future earnings as 
quickly as bad news.  These companies, which are closer to default in debt provisions 
than companies with low leverage ratio, are more likely to take higher risks and 
“manage” earnings through a relatively faster recognition of expected gains (good news), 
in order to reduce the chances of not meeting the requirements of debt indentures, thus 
reducing the asymmetric timeliness that I find for the rest of the sample.  Second, 
companies with executives compensated more heavily based on the company’s 
accounting performances do consistently exhibit, contrary to what I expected based on 
previous literature, aggressive accounting, defined as expected gains recognized in annual 
earnings faster than losses.  This might provide evidence of the relative power of the 
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firm’s executives (who have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to increase an 
annual compensation package based on the firm’s accounting performance) over 
shareholders, who have incentives to enforce conservative accounting to reduce the 
chances of overpaying the firm’s management.  Additionally (3), companies that in the 
previous year were audited by one of the big 4/big 7 audit firms and that received an 
unqualified auditor opinion without explanatory language show a more conditional 
conservative behavior than the rest of the sample.  Finally, over a reduced sample of 
6,282 firm-year observations, I find that companies receiving an auditors’ opinion 
qualified with the going concern assumption had been aggressive in the year prior to the 
going concern opinion but become highly conservative in the year of the opinion and the 
year following.  Significantly,  during the year of the going concern opinion and the 
following year, these firms exhibit a higher conditional conservative behavior than other 
firms in the sample with clear auditors’ opinions.  
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature that analyzes 
conservative accounting and justifies the new proxy used to capture good/bad news.  
Chapter 3 describes the model and the hypotheses tested in the dissertation. Chapter 4 
provides a short description of the sample and details its descriptive statistics.  Chapter 5 
outlines the research design and provides results.  Chapter 6 performs some sensitivity 
analyses.  Chapter 7 concludes and points to future avenues for research. 
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2. Conditional Conservatism in Accounting 
2.1 Conservatism Determinants 
Previous literature, summarized in Watts (LaFond and Watts 2006; Watts 2003a, 
2003b; Ball et al. 2005), suggests five alternative explanations for conservatism in 
financial reporting.  The first explanation is its use as efficient technology employed in 
firm governance.  A conservative accounting approach is used to deal with the moral 
hazard determined by the asymmetric information, limited liability, and asymmetric 
payoffs of the different parties involved in the firms, e.g. management compensation and 
debt contracts.  Watts  argues that contracting is a likely reason for the start of both 
accounting and conservatism, and that “conservatism constrains managerial opportunistic 
behavior and offsets managerial biases with its asymmetrical verifiability requirement” 
(2003a).  The second possible explanation for accounting conservatism is limiting 
shareholders’ litigation.  Overstating a firm’s net assets is more likely to increase the 
litigation costs for the firm than understating net assets.  Thus, with conservatism, the 
firm reduces its expected litigation costs.  The third possible explanation is taxation; in 
profitable firms, conservatism reduces the present value of taxes5, thus increasing the 
value of the firm.  The fourth possible explanation of conservatism in financial reporting 
is standard setters’ and regulators’ incentives. Both standard setters and regulators are 
exposed to asymmetric loss functions because they would be more criticized if they adopt 
accounting standards that favor overstatement of net assets instead of understatement of 
net assets.  Finally, the fifth reason for conservatism in financial accounting is 
theoretically introduced and empirically tested recently by LaFond and Watts (2006); the 
different information sets between informed and uninformed investors create incentives 
                                                 
5 Deferring revenues recognition and accelerating expenses recognition. 
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for the firm’s shareholders to adopt conservative accounting reporting.  They argue that 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors creates agency costs, 
thus reducing the firm’s expected future cash flow and increasing the equilibrium rate of 
return required by investors.  Both effects reduce the firm’s value; therefore,  
conservatism is a corporate governance mechanism used to mitigate the value reduction 
effect of the information asymmetry.  The commonalities of these five explanations for 
conservatism in financial reporting are the asymmetric loss functions of different parties 
with stakes in the firm and the parties’ asymmetric information sets about the firm.   
 
 
2.2 Empirical Approaches 
The traditional textbook definition of conservatism focuses on choices among 
different accounting methods (LIFO vs. FIFO, for instance).  More recently, the literature 
introduced a distinction between two different types of conservatism.  The first is the 
unconditional (or news independent) conservatism that occurs with the expensing of the 
costs of most intangibles, for instance R&D costs, and is reflected in the understatement 
of the book-to-market ratio.  The second is the conditional (or news dependent) 
conservatism, defined as the asymmetric timeliness of recognition in accounting earnings 
of news about unrealized gains and losses, which occurs with impairment of many types 
of assets6.  This differential timeliness definition is also known in literature as “earnings 
conservatism” as compared with “balance sheet conservatism” of the “unconditional 
conservatism” (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Pae et al. 2005).  Empirical results provide 
                                                 
6 “The accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains 
than to recognize bad news as losses” as Basu (1997) defines it.  
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consistent and convincing evidence that conditional conservatism has influenced 
accounting practice for more than 500 years7 (Basu 1997; 2005) and has increased in the 
recent period, both in the United States (Ryan and Zarowin 2003; Watts 2003a; Basu 
1997; Pope and Walker 1999) and in other countries (Ball et al. 2000; Pope and Walker 
1999; Ball et al. 2003; Bushman and Piotroski 2006) 
In their recent paper, Beaver and Ryan (2005) extend their previous accounting 
models (Beaver and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Zarowin 2003) to include probabilistic write-
downs; they also integrate into the analysis the two distinct forms of accounting 
conservatism: unconditional and conditional.  Examples of unconditional conservatism 
(or ex-ante, or news independent) are the immediate expensing of R&D and internally 
generated intangibles, the depreciation of property, plant, and equipment faster than 
economic depreciation, and the historic cost accounting for net present value projects.  
Unconditional conservatism is proxied by the market-to-book ratio.  Conditional 
conservatism (or ex-post, or news dependent) requires the write-down of book values of 
assets under adverse conditions, but not the write-up under favorable conditions.  
Examples of conditional conservatism are the adoption of the lower-of-cost-or-market 
accounting rule for inventory and impairment write-downs for long-lived tangible and 
intangible assets.  The authors complain that recent papers on conservatism are only 
concerned with estimating the extent of conditional conservatism and its association with 
current and lagged returns, while not controlling for unconditional conservatism and its 
frictions with conditional conservatism.  Beaver and Ryan’s model (2005) captures the 
interactions between conditional and unconditional conservatism, modeling different 
                                                 
7 The French Commercial Code as early as 1673 required the adoption of the lower-of-cost-or-market rule 
for inventory. The same rule was adopted in Prussia from 1794.  Moreover, Italian accounting records show 
that asset write-downs were required as early as the 1400s.  
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independent variables to explain probability and size of asset impairments.  The model 
supports empirical results showing how market-to-book ratio (as proxy for unconditional 
conservatism) is associated with lower conditional conservatism measured by the 
asymmetry of the response of earnings to returns.   
The issue of the interaction between conditional and unconditional conservatism, and 
their measures, has been analyzed by other researchers also (Roychowdhury and Watts 
2006). Basu (2005) suggests that conditional conservatism historically arose from the 
periodic performance assessments needed by businessmen rather than from tax reasons. 
In contrast, historical evidence shows that many forms of unconditional conservatism 
arose from tax and regulatory motivations.  Corporate income taxes have been influential 
in the development of conservative depreciation methods with the goal to maximize the 
depreciation deduction, thus minimizing corporate taxes.  Moreover, the widespread 
adoption of LIFO after the Great Depression was likely due to the attempt of firms to 
reduce the impact of inflation on their income taxes.  In the same way, the common 
expensing of all R&D expenses (before this was mandatory) under SFAS 2 appears to 
have been caused by an IRS ruling. Before 1954, the IRS had an administrative policy of 
allowing the deduction of R&D costs if the company consistently followed this practice 
in its financial accounting.  Since 1954, the Internal Revenue Code (sec. 174) has 
contained a specific provision which allows those intangibles to be deducted regardless of 
the financial accounting practices.  Hence, Basu argues that unconditionally conservative 
accounting methods became widespread for income taxation and market regulation 
reasons, and that those practices are fairly recent, since income taxes were first 
introduced at the end of the eighteenth century. 
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Conditional conservatism may serve as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce 
the information asymmetry among the various parties (managers, shareholders, investors, 
stakeholders in general) involved in firms’ contracts, litigation, taxation, and regulation 
processes.  Much of the information asymmetry arises from the firm’s investment 
opportunity sets, but it also occurs because of the way the firm’s management, more 
informed about events and investment opportunities, formally collects and reports 
information to stakeholders.  Their information advantage gives the managers the 
opportunity, through financial reporting, to transfer a firm’s wealth to themselves in the 
form of insider trading and/or excess compensation based on stock prices.  It is not 
always possible to completely verify the incremental information of the more informed 
part, which generates deadweight losses (Jensen and Meckling 1976) because managers’ 
time and efforts are partially directed toward transferring the firm’s wealth to themselves, 
instead of maximizing the firm’s value on shareholders’ behalf.  The market anticipates 
these deadweight losses and reacts by discounting the firm’s stock prices (LaFond and 
Watts 2006).  Conditional conservatism is adopted then, LaFond and Watts (2006) argue, 
as a corporate governance mechanism used in debt and/or compensation contracts, 
litigation, determination of taxes, and regulation settings to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the parties and the consequent deadweight losses that reduce the 
firm’s expected cash flow and stock prices (Watts 2003a, 2003b).  Moreover, conditional 
conservatism is useful to offset managers’ incentives to overstate earnings and assets, 
while understating liabilities (Pae et al. 2005). 
To assess conservatism, researchers use measures  which can be classified in three 
broad categories (Watts 2003b): A) net asset measures, B) earnings and accruals 
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measures, and C) earnings/stock returns relation measures.  For category A, Feltham-
Ohlson valuation models (Feltham and Ohlson 1995) and book-to-market ratios are used 
to estimate the extent of net assets’ undervaluation.  Measures falling in this category are 
able to assess unconditional conservatism, but cannot detect and measure conditional 
conservatism.  Measures falling under B incorporate the notion that asymmetrical 
treatment of gains and losses produces asymmetry in accruals.  Hence, negative 
cumulative accruals, accruals distribution skewness, earnings distribution skewness, 
earnings reversal, and accruals are used as measures of conservatism.  Finally, measures 
under C exploit the fact that market prices tend to reflect changes in the asset value when 
those changes occur (in a timely recording of expected losses and gains), while 
accounting rules delay the recognition of those changes in the case of expected gains but 
not in the case of expected losses.  Hence, bad news is predicted to be more highly 
associated with stock returns and/or change in the market price of assets than good news.  
Basu (1997; 1995) adopts this last approach and tests conditional conservatism by 
regressing annual accounting earnings on stock returns for the same year separately for 
companies with negative returns and positive returns, adopting returns as a proxy for 
bad/good news.  He predicts, and actually finds, a higher coefficient and a higher R 
square for the bad news sample than for the good news sample.  Specifically, he uses a 
reverse regression of price-deflated earnings on an indicator variable for negative stock 
returns (D), stock returns (R), and stock returns interacted with the indicator variable (all 
at time t): EARN = a + a
0 1
D + ß R + ß
0 1
R*D.  He then tests for and finds the coefficient 
ß
1
, which measures the difference in the slope coefficient for the negative news sample 
respective to the positive news sample, to be significantly positive.  Furthermore, Basu’s 
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study provides evidence that the degree of conservatism in accounting earnings increased 
over the period 1963-1990.  He attributes this increase to changes in the auditors’ liability 
exposure; higher liability exposure is associated with higher conditional accounting 
conservatism.   
Following Basu (1997), a great body of literature analyzing accounting conservatism 
adopted his framework in identifying and measuring conditional conservatism in its most 
important consequence, namely asymmetric timeliness of expected gains and losses in 
reported earnings, using the coefficient ß  or the ratio (ß
1 1
+ ß
0
)/ ß
0
 as a measure of 
conditional conservatism.  Among the early researchers, Ryan and Zarowin (2003) 
investigate the reasons for a decline in the linear relation between annual stock returns 
and accounting earnings over the past 30 years.  They test two related explanations: 1) 
earnings reflect news with a lag with respect to stock prices, and 2) earnings increasingly 
reflect good and bad news in an asymmetric way.  They regress annual earnings on 
current and lagged (up to three periods) annual price changes, with a dummy variable for 
negative price change and all the variables deflated by beginning-of-the-current-year 
prices.  Their analysis of this equation for annual cross-sections from 1966 to 2000 finds 
strongly increasing lags and asymmetry.  Earnings are more strongly associated with 
lagged price changes and more weakly associated with current price changes over time.  
The R square of the regression with lagged price changes grows over time, while the R 
square of the regression without lagged price changes decreases over time.  Moreover, 
they find that earnings reflect current negative price changes more strongly over time 
while reflecting current positive price changes less strongly over time.  The same results 
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of earnings showing asymmetric timeliness with respect to lagged annual returns is 
provided by Pope and Walker (1999).  
More recently, Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) propose a theory and provide 
supporting empirical results to explain the relation between asymmetric timeliness 
(conditional conservatism) and market-to-book ratio (unconditional conservatism).  They 
decompose firms’ equity value into four additive segments: net assets at historical cost, 
verifiable and recognized increases on the value of separable net assets, unverifiable 
increases in the value of separable net assets, and economic rents.  If, as practice seems to 
suggest, the benchmark for accounting reporting is the measure of market value of net 
assets, then both asymmetric timeliness and market-to-book ratio measure conservatism 
with noise, because rents and unverifiable net assets cannot be commonly observed.  
When returns are driven by changes in rents and unverifiable net assets changes, then the 
measure of conservatism introduced by Basu (1997) is not very accurate.  Roychowdhury 
and Watts suggest that asymmetric timeliness is a better measure of conservatism when it 
is estimated cumulatively over multiple years preceding a specific time.  
LaFond and Watts (2006) add a new motivation for the demand of conditional 
accounting conservatism.  They provide evidence that conservatism is an equilibrium 
corporate governance mechanism voluntarily adopted by firms to reduce the deadweight 
losses associated with information asymmetry between equity investors8.  They find that 
information asymmetry among equity investors is strongly positively correlated with 
conservatism, after controlling for other variables that previous literature identified as 
                                                 
8 LaFond and Watts adopt the PIN score developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) to proxy for 
equity investors asymmetric information.  The PIN score is the probability of an information-based trade 
derived from a structural market microstructure model and it has been adopted by numerous papers to 
capture the difference in the information asymmetries between informed and uninformed investors.  
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relevant factors in demand for conservatism.  Moreover, their tests offer evidence that 
changes in information asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors 
temporally lead to changes in conservatism.   
Ryan (2006) argues that, despite the limitations documented in the literature and 
highlighted at the end of this section, asymmetric timeliness is the most direct 
consequence of conditional conservatism.  Hence, asymmetric timeliness should retain its 
primacy in the literature investigating conditional conservatism.  The author offers four 
specific suggestions for estimating asymmetric timeliness and for interpreting it as a 
measure of conditional conservatism: (1) incorporate industry context and industry-
specific measures of news other than returns, (2) incorporate the business cycle and how 
it affects managerial incentives, (3) control or do not control for other factors affecting 
asymmetric timeliness, then compare results, and (4) filter returns when they are used as 
a proxy to assess asymmetric timeliness, in order to mitigate, for instance, the biases 
emphasized by Dietrich et al. (2006) arising from sampling of an endogenous variable.  
Among papers testing how conditional conservatism, as measured by asymmetric 
timeliness, varies over time, Lobo et al. (Lobo and Zhou 2006) document an increase in 
conservatism in financial reporting after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in 2002.9  Others (Ball et al. 2000; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Ryan and Zarowin 2003) offer 
consistent evidence that the asymmetric timeliness series varies across time, explaining 
the variation with changes in legal liability.  Other papers in this stream of literature 
present evidence of a positive association between accounting conservatism and: 
- U.S. high-tech firms (Chandra et al. 2004), because they are subject to more stringent 
accounting standards (SFAS 2) and higher shareholders’ litigation risk;  
                                                 
9 SOX, among other requirements, provides that CEOs and CFOs certify the firm’s financial statements. 
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- public and larger firms in the U.K. (Ball and Shivakumar 2005); 
- firms audited by one of the Big “X” (Krishnan 2005), with longer auditor tenure 
(Jenkins and Velury 2006), after an audit partner rotation (Hamilton et al. 2005) and with 
the accounting expertise (but not with non-accounting expertise) of the audit committee 
members (Krishnan and Gnanakumar 2006). 
Starting with the critique that Basu’s approach lacks an equilibrium pricing model,  
Callen, Hope et al. (2005) approach the study of conservatism in accounting by adopting 
the Callen and Segal asset pricing model (2004).  This model expresses unexpected 
changes in stock returns as a function of unexpected changes in accruals (accruals news), 
unexpected shocks to current and expected future cash flow (cash flow news), and expected 
return (discount rate).  They find empirical evidence of a significant increasing concave 
relation between unexpected changes in stock returns and earnings news.10  Specifically, 
changes in equity returns are more highly correlated with negative earnings news than 
positive earnings news, reflecting that negative earnings news is recorded more promptly 
in the accounting system than positive earnings news.  Moreover, the results of the paper 
also imply that revisions in equity returns are a quasi-concave function of special items; 
i.e. revisions in equity returns are more highly positively correlated with negative special 
items than with positive special items.  
Dietrich et al. (2006) criticize the use of the asymmetric timeliness measure to test the 
hypothesis that reported accounting earnings are “conservative.”  The authors identify 
econometric properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure that cause 
biases in the test statistics, unless restrictive conditions are met.  In particular, they 
highlight two econometric biases that characterize this approach: a sample-variance-ratio 
                                                 
10 The model assumes earning news equal to the sum of cash flow news and accruals news.  
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(SVR) bias and a sample truncation (ST) bias.  These biases arise from the sampling 
formation procedure on an endogenous variable11 - returns - and the consequent 
distributional properties of the truncated sample.  The authors build data series that are, 
by construction, devoid of asymmetric timeliness in reported earnings and show that the 
asymmetric timeliness research design still finds evidence of conservative behavior, i.e. a 
more timely recognition of bad news than good news in annual earnings.  Moreover, they 
show that cash flow from operations, in theory, is unaffected by accruals and, therefore, 
by conservative accounting standards, but exhibits a stronger conservative behavior 
(quicker recognition of expected losses than gains) than the operating accruals 
themselves.  Hence, they conclude that, because the biases originate in the asymmetric 
timeliness specification design itself, alternative measures such as negative non-operating 
accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000), market-to-book ratio (Feltham and Ohlson 1995), and 
change in cash investments (Easton and Pae 2004) should be adopted to further 
investigate accounting conservatism.  The underlying assumption of the paper is that 
earnings information leads (causes) returns.  As a consequence, regressing earnings on 
returns produces biased results that cannot be corrected.  In this regard, Ryan (2006) 
notices that Dietrich’s assumption seems to go against the common evidence in finance 
and accounting literature that it is more likely that both earnings and returns are driven by 
other, more primitive information.  Indeed, when researchers regress returns on earnings, 
the observed R square is extremely low, suggesting that there are other variables 
important in explaining returns to investors besides reported earnings. 
 
                                                 
11 Returns, indeed, can be affected by earning information, generating endogeneity in the Basu regression.  
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2.3 Theoretical Approaches 
Recent authors who approach the study of conservatism in accounting from a 
theoretical point of view are Bagnoli (2005) and Dierker (2006).  
Bagnoli and Watts (2005) develop a signaling model to study managers’ decisions to 
be more or less conservative in their financial accounting, within the limit of the rules 
provided by GAAP. Under specific conditions, market investors can use the signals 
coming from managers’ decisions to infer the firm’s private information and thus better 
predict the firm’s future value. In their model, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) assume that 
managers have private information about the probability that the firm’s future results are 
good.  Following their model, the authors show (Proposition 6) that the earning response 
coefficient (ERC12) for firms choosing not to report conservatively (in a manner that is 
expected to lead to higher reported earnings) is greater than the ERC for conservative 
firms, if the conservative report policy is more informative than the non-conservative 
policy, and/or if a firm’s future forecast is relatively positive. 
Dierker (2006) provides a model focused on regulatory conservatism, in which 
accounting conservatism is a means to avoid speculative financial bubbles and stocks’ 
overvaluation.  In his model, conservatism matters because risk-adverse agents receive 
financial information from the market.  However, even if they know the information has a 
conservative bias, they do not know its magnitude (random bias) and cannot evaluate the 
news accurately.  This situation, along with concerns about overvaluation (as suggested 
by Watts (Watts 2003b; 2003a)) and the fact that financial markets process negative news 
with a systematic bias (in the sense that “bad news travels slowly” as Hong et al. (2000) 
                                                 
12 ERS is the slope coefficient in a linear regression of abnormal cumulated returns over the announcement 
period. 
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have shown), motivate the regulators to mandate counter-biased accounting standards.  
The author provides a model in which he proves that, while the market is not perfectly 
efficient and frictionless, a conservative accounting regime leads to lower equilibrium 
asset prices than  a full disclosure regime, justifying the conservatism in accounting as a 
tool available to regulators to achieve more efficient prices.  
 
2.4 Problem with Using Market Returns as Proxy for Good/Bad News and My Adoption 
of Number of Analysts’ EPS Estimate Revisions as a Replacement Proxy  
Basu (1997) defines conditional conservatism as the accountant’s tendency to require 
a higher degree of verification for the recognition of good news in earnings than bad 
news.  To measure conditional conservatism I will adopt Basu’s definition within the 
framework based on the theory of conservatism in accounting illustrated by Watts 
(2003b; 2003a) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2006).  In this framework, the objective 
of accounting is to assess, at a point in time, the firm’s value available for interim 
distribution to the company’s claimants (shareholders, bondholders, employees, other 
stakeholders), and not to measure the market value of the shareholders’ equity.  The 
accounting system, as we can observe in practice, pursues this objective through the 
adoption of rules that recognize increases in separable asset values only when they are 
completely verifiable.  This definition of the  object of measure is key to understanding 
why the variable traditionally used as a proxy of good/bad news about the firm’s future 
earnings (returns to investors) introduces noise in the assessment of conditional 
conservatism.  
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Basu (1997) introduces market returns as a proxy for good and bad news about 
expected gains/losses.  Specifically, he adopts negative unexpected annual stock returns 
as a proxy for bad news, and positive unexpected annual stock returns as a proxy for 
good news.  He tests his hypotheses in a Beaver “reverse” regression with earnings per 
share deflated by beginning of period stock price as a dependent variable.  The 
justification for this reverse regression design is that OLS standard errors and test 
statistics are better specified when the leading variable is the independent variable and 
the lagging variable is specified as dependent.   
Using returns as a proxy for good and bad news about firms’ future earnings, however, 
creates two main economic and econometric problems.  First, if returns on the market are 
driven by the value or the changes in the values (good and bad news) of rents13 or 
unobservable increases in the value of separable net assets, these changes will never be 
included in reported earnings.  Indeed, accounting recognizes increases in separable asset 
values when they are completely verifiable but does not recognize changes in rents, nor 
increases in unobservable separable net assets (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006).  If this is 
true, then the asymmetric timeliness approach that Basu adopts will measure conditional 
conservatism rather inaccurately, because of the noise introduced by the choice of the 
variable market returns as a measure of good/bad news about firms’ future earnings.  
Basu’s reverse regression approach, indeed, works only if returns summarize news from 
sources other than accounting earnings and the news can be, at least in principle, 
recognized in earnings in the same period (Ryan 2006).  Rents, however, are only 
recognized in the accounting system when they are acquired, not when they are generated 
                                                 
13 Where rents are defined,  following the guidance of Roychowdhury and Watts (2006), as growth options 
and monopoly returns. 
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inside the firm.  Additionally, changes in rents are recognized only for decreases in 
acquired rents, and not always consistently (cfr. FAS 142).  Returns, finally, may not 
reflect all non-accounting information available, may reflect good and bad news 
depending on the firm’s disclosure policies, or may be driven by the information content 
of earnings, creating an endogeneity problem in the Basu reverse regression.  Ryan’s 
conclusion is: “it would be preferable to estimate asymmetric timeliness using measures 
of news other than returns” (2006 p. 11).   
The second problem with Basu’s framework has been highlighted in Dietrich et al. 
(2006).  The authors provide a model that describes the relations among economic 
income, reported accounting earnings, non-earnings information flowing to the market, 
and stock returns.  In their model, information (both accounting and non-accounting 
information) about the firm’s underlying value (economic income) drives the firm’s stock 
price.  They argue that Basu’s model, reversing the relation of accounting (reported 
earnings) and non-accounting information driving the firm’s stock price, and adopting 
instead accounting information as the dependent variable in the regression of reported 
earnings on changes in the firm’s stock price (returns), causes two types of biases: 
sample-variance-ratio bias and sample truncation bias.  The regression coefficient 
estimates suffer from these two biases, one arising from the regression specification and 
one arising from sampling on an endogenous and asymmetrically distributed variable 
(returns).  Although those biases can be negligible, as Ryan (2006) points out, at least one 
of the two is related to the adoption of returns, an endogenous variable, as a measure of 
news and treated in the model as an independent variable.  
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Ball and Shivakumar (2006), in an attempt to address the problem of using market 
returns as a proxy for good/bad news, instead adopt cash flow from operations as a proxy 
for good/bad news about future firm’s earnings.  However, cash flow from operations 
shows asymmetric timeliness, is affected by different accounting choices, is part of 
earnings (causing an endogeneity problem more serious than the returns proxy), and is 
highly correlated with accruals.   
To address these issues with the choice of the variable to measure good/bad news, I 
adopt a new measure of news: the number of financial analysts’ estimates of earnings per 
share (EPS) raised/lowered over the period.  Every time an accounting or non-accounting 
piece of information reaches the market, financial analysts evaluate the impact of the 
good/bad news on future EPS and revise (or not) their  EPS estimates.  Changes in the 
estimates, thus, capture news arrival during the fiscal year.  This measure of news offers a 
few advantages over the traditional returns proxy:  
- There is no reason to believe, a priori, that the distribution of the number of analysts’ 
estimate revisions is non symmetric, which would address, partially, the issues raised 
by Dietrich et al. (2006).  Indeed, ex post, the symmetry plot of the change in 
analysts’ estimates suggests that the variable exhibits a symmetric distribution around 
a mean value of –1, confirmed by the skewness value of the distribution equal to –
0.049.  
- Adopting the number of analysts’ estimate revisions in EPS does attenuate the 
endogeneity problem of using returns as a proxy.  Changes in EPS estimates for year 
t+1 from one day after the end of the fiscal year t until the end of fiscal year t+1 
should not, indeed, influence the annual reported earnings of year t.  This will address 
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Ryan’s suggestion (Ryan 2006) of using measures of news that do not involve 
returns, or filtering returns removing the portion in windows around earnings 
announcements to limit the endogeneity problem.  
- The number of changes in EPS estimates should be less noisy than the returns on the 
market in measuring the good/bad news.  This measure will reflect all, and only, the 
pieces of information (news) that will impact the firm’s future earnings and that will 
have a chance to be recorded in annual earnings over the years, based on the analysts’ 
professional judgment.  
The new approach, using the new variable associated with the adoption of a LAD 
regression, allows for a more precise measure of conditional conservatism, filtering out 
the noise in the previous variable to better capture the underlying asymmetry in the 
recognition of good/bad news in annual reported earnings.  
In summary, previous literature identified conservatism as one of the salient attributes 
of financial reporting and disclosure, along with reliability and relevance.  The problem, 
however, is how to measure conditional conservatism in financial reporting.  The 
existing literature identifies the asymmetric timeliness in reporting good or bad news in 
annual reported earnings as the most important consequence of conditional conservatism.  
So far, researchers have adopted the positive or negative annual returns on the market 
(either between 9 months before and 3 months after fiscal year-end or over the fiscal 
year) as a proxy for good/bad news, regressing annual net income over this proxy to 
determine whether, and how much faster, bad news about future earnings was 
incorporated in annual reported earnings compared to good news.  Results show that bad 
news was incorporated six times faster than good news in contemporaneous annual 
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reported earnings.  Returns, however, are a very noisy proxy for good/bad news, 
suffering from endogeneity and causing econometric biases in the coefficient estimates of 
Basu’s research design, leading to detection of spurious conditional conservatism even 
when, by sample construction, none is present (Dietrich et al. 2006).  Instead of returns 
on the market, I adopt a new proxy that captures and measures the flow of good/bad news 
about firms’ future earnings in a in a less noisy way: the number of financial analysts’ 
estimates of earnings per share (EPS) raised/lowered over the period.  Some of the pieces 
of information about future earnings will be incorporated at the end of the fiscal period in 
net income, and some will be incorporated in the future.  Consequently, the regression of 
net income (before extraordinary items) on the proxy for good/bad news will cast light on 
the presence of conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric timeliness in recording 
news about unrealized gains/losses on annual reported earnings, for the companies 
included in the sample from 1991 to 2005.  
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3. Model and Hypotheses 
I propose to analyze accounting conservatism with a model of earnings deflated by 
beginning-of-period market value on the difference in the number of upward and 
downward revisions in analysts’ EPS estimates over the fiscal year (Model 1): 
ititititititit NumEstDDiffDiffDPX 210101 */ βββαα ++++=−                                       (1) 
where: 
itX  denotes the earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data18) for firm i in 
fiscal year t;  is the market value of equity (number of shares outstanding times price 
on the market from CRSP) at the beginning of the fiscal year t;  is the difference 
between upward and downward revisions in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i and 
period t (from First Call database);  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if <0, and 
equal to zero otherwise. NumEst
1−itP
itDiff
itD itDiff
it is the number of analysts that are following the 
company throughout the year, which I adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher 
number in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of 
analysts following it, but from the amount of good/bad news about the company’s future 
cash flow.  The model builds from Basu’s intuition of testing the different timeliness of 
good/bad news reported in annual earnings.  However, I made four changes to the 
original Basu model: the adoption of a different variable to proxy for good/bad news 
about firms’ future cash flow, the adoption of a LAD regression approach instead of the 
classic OLS, the extension of the analysis to two-year and three-year time horizons, and 
the presence of the control variable NumEstit.  
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3.1 Analysts’ Forecast Revisions as a Proxy for Good/Bad News 
The first hypothesis that I test in this dissertation is whether, using a different proxy 
for good/bad news within the Basu intuitive framework, I still find asymmetric timeliness 
in the recognition of good/bad news in reported earnings.  If by adopting the new proxy 
the asymmetry disappears, then Dietrich et al. (2006) were correct in attributing the 
results found with the Basu model to the econometric biases highlighted above.  
However, if by using the new proxy (which reduces the magnitude of the two biases 
related to the adoption of returns as a proxy for good/bad news), the asymmetric 
timeliness persists, then the asymmetric timeliness research design cannot be considered 
invalid and unable to capture the conditional conservatism in the accounting system.  
To test for asymmetric timeliness, I use the piecewise regression approach of Model 
(1), with a dummy equal to one when the number of EPS revisions downward over the 
period is higher than the number of revisions upward, which means that over the fiscal 
year, analysts received more bad news about future earnings than good news.  However, 
since the independent variable is now related to the analysts’ forecast revisions, a quantile 
regression is more appropriate than the traditional OLS regression.  Indeed, previous 
literature found that analysts seem to process public information regarding their earnings 
forecasts in a somewhat biased way, due to “analysts’ optimism” (Ramnath et al. 2006).  
Because of this optimism, I expect analysts to overvalue the good news and include it 
fairly quickly in their forecast revisions.  This analysts’ optimism can explain the 
different timeliness in recording good and bad news about future earnings in reported 
earnings found by previous literature.  Hence, upon running a traditional OLS regression, 
I expect the interaction variable coefficient ( 1β ) in the model to be statistically equal to 
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zero.  This analysts’ inefficiency disappears if, instead of an OLS regression, researchers 
use a quantile (or least absolute deviation, LAD) regression (Basu and Markov 2004).  
Quantile regression assumes that analysts deal with a linear loss function, trying to 
minimize their absolute forecast error instead of the square of the forecast error, as in the 
OLS case.  The LAD estimator, LADβ  (n-element column vector), minimizes the sum of 
the absolute errors.  While the OLS regression provides unbiased estimators of the mean 
of the dependent variable conditional on the independent variables, the LAD regression 
(or, more generally, quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett 1978)) provides unbiased 
estimates of the median (n quantile) of the dependent variable conditional on the 
independent variables.  When the dependent variable and the model errors are distributed 
symmetrically and the errors are independent from the explanatory variables adopted, 
both OLS and LAD yield estimates of the same parameter vector.  In this case, 
researchers usually choose the estimator with the lower variance.  The variance of the 
estimator depends on the kurtosis of the error distribution.  OLS provides a lower 
variance estimator in the case of normal distribution, while the LAD estimator is 
characterized by lower variance with fat tails distributions (Basu and Markov 2004; 
Newey and Powell 1987).  Prior literature (Basu 1995; Frecka and Hopwood 1983) 
provides evidence that scaled earnings distribution is left-skewed, which might suggest 
that the conditional distribution of the dependent variable in model (1), scaled earnings, is 
skewed too.  Thus, I expect to find the interaction coefficient 1β  positive when I run a 
quantile regression.  Hence, the first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: The value of the interaction variable coefficient in Model (1) is 
significant and positive when I run a quantile regression, while close to zero (or even 
negative) when I run an OLS regression. 
 
3.2 Conditional Conservatism Determinants 
Previous literature (Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2006) offers five alternative 
explanations for conservatism in financial reporting: (1) debt and managerial contracting, 
(2) taxation, (3) asymmetric information among investors, (4) asymmetric loss function 
of standard setters, and (5) shareholders’ litigation.  
The explanation for conditional conservatism due to debt contracting implies that 
debt-holders require the firm to adopt high conservative accounting standards to avoid the 
distribution of a firm’s wealth to other claimholders in case of the firm’s financial 
default.  If this is the correct theory to explain conservatism in accounting, then, all else 
equal, I would expect a higher conservatism for firms with high leverage (higher 
proportion of debt over equity) than for firms with low leverage.  This leads to the second 
hypothesis tested in this dissertation: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high leverage exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than 
firms with low leverage.  
 
The managerial contracting theory explains the adoption of conditional conservative 
accounting standards and practice as an attempt by the shareholders to avoid  
overcompensating the firm’s managers based on future expected gains before these gains 
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actually translate into positive cash flow for the firm.  The more the executives’ 
compensation packages are based on the firm’s accounting performances, the more I 
would expect shareholders to ask for the adoption of more conservative accounting 
practices.  On the other hand, the more executives’ compensation packages are based on 
the firm’s accounting performances (in the form of bonuses), the more I would expect the 
executives to use aggressive accounting, recognizing expected gains more quickly than 
losses in earnings, to increase their compensation.  Then, the third hypothesis I test in the 
dissertation is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with compensation contracts for executives highly dependent on 
the firm’s accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms 
with compensation contracts not based on the firm’s accounting performance .  
 
Previous literature (Basu 1997) also found that changes in the level of conservatism 
over time were likely due to a change in the auditors’ legal liability exposure.  When 
auditors are more exposed to the risk of being sued in relation to their work, they tend to 
require the client firms to be more conservative.  After auditors state a going concern 
opinion, then, I would expect the clients to adopt very rigorous conservative accounting 
standards, to reduce the risk of legal liability for the auditors and for the management.  
This leads to the fourth hypothesis that I test in the dissertation: 
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Hypothesis 4: Firms that the previous year received a going concern opinion or a 
clear opinion with explanatory language from auditors exhibit higher asymmetric 
timeliness than other firms in the sample. 
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4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
I gather market data from CRSP monthly files and accounting data from Compustat 
North America annual industrial for the period between 1963 and 2005.  Data about 
analysts’ EPS forecasts from 1989 to 2005 come from the First Call database.  Data about 
auditors’ going-concern opinions from 2000 to 2005 come from the Audit Analytics 
database.  Finally, executive compensation data from 1991 to 2005 are taken from 
ExecuComp database.  
I calculate the value of earnings deflated by the beginning of the period market value, 
X/Pit, and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, X/Pwinit, as earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year t, divided by the market 
value of equity (MktValit, equal to the number of shares outstanding, Compustat DATA25, 
times price per share, Compustat DATA199) for firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year 
t.  I compute Diffit as the difference between the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum 
of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i over the 
fiscal period t (from First Call database).  Moreover, to compare the results with the Basu 
model, I calculate cumulative buy-and-hold annual returns (Rit, and winsorized at the first 
and 99th percentile values, Rwinit) as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) 
over the period starting 9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal end of the 
year 1
1
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−t
t
it P
PR14, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period .  I also 
run the analysis calculating cumulative buy-and-hold annual returns for the fiscal period 
to make sure the results are not driven by the time horizon adopted.  I collect 
compensation information for all the executives of the company from the ExecuComp 
                                                 
14 To ensure that the market reaction to a previous year’s earnings is excluded from the analysis. 
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15database.  In particular, I sum for each company and each year the total salary  
(SALARY 16 17 (BONUS ), and other annual compensation  (SUMOTHit) the total bonus it it) 
paid to the firm’s executives.  The executive ratio (Exeit) is calculated as ExecuComp 
SALARYit + all other annual compensation (SUMOTHit), divided by total current 
compensation (SALARY+BONUS) plus all other annual compensation (SUMOTH) for 
each year and each firm.  Data are at a firm level, as I sum salary, bonus, and all other 
annual compensation for all the executives of the company for each year.  Market-to-
book ratio (MBit) is calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided by DATA60.  
Leverage (Levit) is calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6.  I use 
the total number of analysts following a given firm in the year (data from First Call) as a 
control variable in the regression.  The information about auditors’ opinions for each 
company and each year come from Compustat (DATA149) and from Audit Analytics 
(going_concern field).  As a control for heteroskedasticity, the OLS regressions report 
White t-statistics (White 1980).   
Descriptive statistics of the sample show that the sample mean of total assets is 
$8,971 million, the average market-to-book ratio is 3.50, and the average leverage ratio is 
0.23.  The mean of the scaled net income before extraordinary items is positive (1.71), 
even when I winsorize the variable at the first and 99th percentile values (0.037).  Positive 
is also the average value of the buy and hold returns, both when I do not winsorize the 
variable (12.63%) and when I do winsorize at the first and 99th percentile values 
                                                 
15 The dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive officers during the 
fiscal year. 
16 The dollar value of a bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive officers during the fiscal 
year. 
17 This is the amount listed under “All Other Compensation” in the Summary Compensation Table.  This 
includes items such as: 1) Severance Payments; 2) Debt Forgiveness; 3) Imputed Interest; 4) Payouts for 
cancellation of stock options; 5) Payment for unused vacation; 6) Tax reimbursements; 7) Signing bonuses; 
8) 401K contributions; 9) Life insurance premiums. 
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(10.68%),  suggesting that the companies in the sample are profitable and deliver positive 
return to investors.  The variable adopted as a proxy of good/bad news about earnings, 
Diff, is symmetrically distributed around the mean value that is approximately –1, 
suggesting that, on average, there is more bad news than good news over the fiscal 
period.  For the average company, there are 15 upward and 16 downward revisions in the 
analysts’ EPS estimates over 12 months.  These descriptive statistics for the sample are 
consistent with other recent studies (LaFond and Watts 2006).  
The correlation table, reporting Pearson correlation coefficients, shows that returns 
(both winsorized and non-winsorized) exhibit a significant positive correlation with the 
Diff variable, and with the number of upward revisions in the analysts’ EPS forecast. 
Returns, as expected, are negatively correlated with the downward revisions in the 
analysts’ EPS forecast.  The proxy variable for good/bad news, Diff, is positively 
correlated with the size of the company, as measured by total assets value (DATA6 of 
Compustat), with the scaled earnings variable after winsorizing (X/Pwin) and with the 
firm’s market value of equity, while it is negatively correlated with the leverage ratio 
(Lev).  
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5. Research Design and Empirical Results 
I adopt the asymmetric timeliness framework first introduced by Basu (1997) to 
measure conditional conservatism, adapting it to test the four hypotheses of the 
dissertation.  However, I make four important changes to the original model.  First, I use 
the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward and the downward revisions in 
the analysts’ EPS forecast to measure good/bad news.  Second, I run a LAD regression 
instead of an OLS regression.  Third, following the findings in previous literature 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2006), I extend the analysis to two-year and three-year time 
horizons.  Fourth, I control in the regression for NumEstit-j,t, the number of analysts that 
are following the company throughout the year, as an indirect control of the firm’s size, 
or visibility. 
 
5.1 Hypothesis 1 
I estimate the Model (1):  
           (1) tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDDiffDiffDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα
/Pwhere the dependent variable, Xit-j,t it-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earnings deflated 
by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t.  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative 
difference between the sum of the upward and downward revisions in the analysts’ EPS 
forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0, and equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t, is the 
number of analysts that follow the company (i between fiscal year t-j and t), which I 
adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher number in the variable Diffit-j,t is not 
coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts following it, but from the 
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amount of good/bad news about unrealized gains/losses.  Furthermore, I winsorize the 
variable Xit-j,t/P and returns to investors at the first and 99thit-j-1,t-1  percentile values to 
reduce the influence of outliers, but (non-tabulated) regression results for non-winsorized 
variables show qualitatively similar evidence.   
[Insert table 2 about here] 
I compare the results obtained estimating Model (1) using OLS and LAD regressions 
with the original Basu model/variables regression results, for the three time horizons 
corresponding to j=0, j=1, and j=2.  As expected, Table 2 shows that, when I estimate 
Model (1) with a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression, the analysts’ optimism 
(Ramnath et al. 2006) overcomes the conservative accounting standards and the model 
fails to detect any asymmetry in the timeliness of recognition of good/bad news about 
future earnings over the sample (interaction coefficient positive but not statistically 
different from zero) when the analysis is limited to a one year period (j=0).  Expanding 
the time horizon with an OLS regression to two and three years (j=1 and j=2) shows 
evidence of conditional conservatism (interaction coefficient β1 positive and statistically 
significant).  These results provide indirect support for expanding the time horizon to 
two/three years when adopting an OLS regression, because, as previous literature 
suggested, Basu’s single-period asymmetry is just an implication of accounting standards 
requiring asymmetric verification for the recognition of good and bad news in accounting 
earnings, and not a measure of the aggregate conditional conservatism at the firm level 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2006).   
When I adopt a LAD regression, to take into consideration the linear loss function 
that previous research identified as more appropriate for financial analysts (Basu and 
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Markov 2004; Clatwhrthy et al. 2006), I consistently find, as expected, a positive and 
significant value for the coefficient of the interaction term over all the time horizons 
(equal to 0.000289, t value of 7.31 for j=0, 0.000268, t value of 5.14 for j=1, and equal to 
0.000260, t value of 3.93 for j=2).  Results for the LAD regression show a consistent 
presence of conditional conservatism over the three time horizons.  If I adopt the relative 
measure of asymmetry that has been used in the accounting literature since Basu (1997), 
calculating the ratio of (β1+β )/β0 0 to measure how much fasterbad news is recognized in 
reported annual earning than good news, I find that bad news is recognized in reported 
earnings respectively 7.1 times (for j=0), 4.5 times (for j=1) and 3.0 times (for j=2) faster 
than good news.  There is an evident decreasing trend in the asymmetric timeliness18 
when the analysis is extended from one to three-year horizon, suggesting, again, that the 
extension of the time horizon recommended by Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) is 
appropriate.  If I run the traditional Basu model over the sample (with returns as a proxy 
for good/bad news), I find results consistent with the presence of conservatism as in the 
original Basu model, thereby indirectly validating the sample adopted in this study.   
 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 
To test the hypothesis of increase in conditional conservatism associated with 
increase in the importance of debt as a source of financing for the company operations, I 
subdivide the sample in quartiles based on the leverage ratio (Levit) for firm i at time t, 
                                                 
18 Although I do not formally run cross-equation tests for the statistical difference of the ratio values among 
the different time horizons, I do run simple F tests for a range of constant values to see which values each 
ratio is statistically different from.  This creates a confidence interval for each ratio.  The ratio of 7.1 for j=0 
is statistically different from the value 3 (F value of 5.12, p value of 0.0237) but not statistically different 
from the value 4.5 (F value of 1.01, p value of 0.3143).  The ratio of 4.5 for j=1 is not statistically different 
from either 3 or 7.1 (respectively F value of 2.10, p value of 0.1470 and F value of 0.55, p value of 0.4596).  
Finally, The ratio of 3 is statistically different (at 10% confidence level) from the value of 7.1 (F value of 
3.60, p value of 0.0579) but not different from the value of 4.5 (F value of 1.10, p value of 0.2933). 
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calculated as firm’s total debt (DATA9+DATA34 of Compustat) divided by total assets 
(DATA6 of Compustat).  Then, I measure the conditional conservatism in the lowest and 
highest quartile with Model (1) running a LAD regression (Table 3 Panel A and B).   
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Furthermore, I run the model, based on Model (1) with the new variable Lev, to 
measure the leverage ratio (Model 2): 
tjittjittjittjittjittjittjittjit
tjittjittjittjittjittjit
NumEstDDiffLevDiffLevDLev
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tjit
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*/
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     (2) 
where all the variables are defined above, and Levit-j,t is the leverage ratio.  Consistent 
with results from previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2006), I expect to find a higher 
level of conservatism (higher coefficient estimate for β1) from Model (1) for companies 
with high leverage ratio (Table 3 Panel B) than for companies with low leverage ratio 
(Table 3 Panel A). I also expect a significant and positive value for the estimate of the 
coefficient β5, in Model (2), which shows how bad news is recorded in annual reported 
earnings more quickly than good news for companies with higher leverage ratio (Table 3 
Panel C).   
Results for firms in the lowest quartile (Table 3 Panel A), with a low annual debt-to-
assets ratio (leverage ratio mean value equal to 0.0158), show for Model (1) a positive 
and significant interaction coefficient estimate β1 (equal to 0.00025, T value of 1.96 for 
j=2), providing evidence of conditional conservatism, i.e. bad news recognized in annual 
earnings more quickly than good news.  Results for firms in the highest leverage ratio 
quartile (Table 3 Panel B), with leverage ratio mean value of 0.5042, show for Model (1) 
an interaction coefficient estimate β non-statistically different from zero (-0.000017, T 1 
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value of 0.08 for j=2), exhibiting, rather surprisingly, symmetric timeliness in the 
recording of good/bad news in annual reported earnings.  For firms with high debt-to-
assets ratio, then, there is no evidence of the use of conservative accounting, with good 
news recognized in annual reported earnings as fast as bad news.  Table 3 Panel C reports 
the results of the estimation of Model (2).  Contrary to the expectations originating from 
previous literature’s suggestion that debt contracting is a determinant of conditional 
conservatism, results show a positive association between the level of leverage ratio and 
the speed of recognition in annual reported earnings of good news, instead of bad news.  
Although these results are not consistent with the findings in the conservative accounting 
stream of literature (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006; LaFond and Watts 2006), they are  
consistent with results provided by the earnings management literature.  Companies with 
a high leverage ratio (closer to default in debt provisions than companies with low 
leverage ratio) are more likely to take higher risks and “manage” earnings, through a 
relatively faster recognition of expected gains, in order to reduce the chances of not 
meeting the requirements included in the debt indentures.  This behavior would cause a 
reduction in the level of conservatism in their annual reported earnings.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis 3 
To test the third hypothesis, I gather data from the Executive Compensation section of 
Compustat for firms between 1992 and 2005.  First, I measure the amount of annual 
compensation that does not depend on firm accounting performance: SALARY, equal to 
the dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive 
officers during the fiscal year and all other annual compensation (ALLOTHTOT), which 
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includes items such as severance payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts 
for cancellation of stock options, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, 
signing bonuses, 401K contributions, and life insurance premiums. 
Second, I measure the amount of total current compensation (SALARY+BONUS) 
from ExecuComp and add all other annual compensation (ALLOTHTOT) to calculate the 
total annual compensation19.  
Third, I compute Exe as the ratio of SALARY+ALLOTHTOT divided by the total 
annual compensation (SALARY+BONUS+ALLOTHTOT) and use it as an index of the 
incentives for executives to use an aggressive accounting practice, recognizing unrealized 
gains more quickly than unrealized losses in the annual reported earnings, with the aim to 
increase their total annual compensation.  The lower the index, the higher the incentives 
for executives to adopt aggressive accounting practice.  Managers can  increase their total 
annual compensation, for example, by accelerating the recognition in actual earnings of 
future unrealized gains, within GAAP rules.  On the other side of the coin, shareholders 
know about these incentives. In fact, previous literature provided evidence that they 
enforce more stringent conservative accounting rules as the  firm executives’ incentives 
to adopt  an aggressive accounting practice raise (Watts 2003a, 2003b), to reduce the 
chances of  overpaying the firm’s managers.  
To test the hypothesis that firms with compensation contracts for executives highly 
dependent on the firm’s accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness 
than firms with compensation contracts not dependent on a firm’s performance, I adopt 
the following model, adapting Model (1) with the introduction of a new variable Exe to 
                                                 
19 I do not use the variable total annual compensation (TDC2) from ExecuComp because TDC2 includes 
items such as the net value of stock options exercised.  The inclusion of stock options and other stock-based 
compensation incentives rather than earnings based incentive would confound my results. 
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measure the incentives of the firm’s executives to adopt a more timely recognition of 
unrealized gains than losses in annual earnings (Model 3):  
NumEstDDiffExeDiffExeDExe
DDiffExeDiffDPX
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All the variables are defined above.  I expect to find the coefficient of the interaction term 
β5 negative and statistically significant, indicating that, as previous literature pointed out 
(Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2006), one of the determinants of conditional 
conservatism in accounting is its use by shareholders as an efficient form of firm 
governance, particularly in management compensation contracts.  The higher the 
executive ratio index value (Exe), the higher the portion of the total annual compensation 
that does not depend on firm accounting performances.  Hence, I would expect the 
incentives for shareholders to ask for a rigorous enforcement of conditional conservatism 
to decrease in response to the decrease in the executives’ incentives to recognize good 
news more quickly than bad news in the annual reported earnings.   
[Insert table 4 about here] 
Table 4 shows that, contrary to expectations, the coefficient estimate for the 
interaction term β5 for Model (3) is positive and significant at 5% level in the two-year 
time horizon (j=1), and in the three-year time horizon (j=2), while it is not statistically 
different from zero in the one-year time horizon (j=0).  This provides evidence that firms 
implementing executive compensation more dependent on a firm’s accounting 
performances recognize unrealized gains in earnings in a more timely manner than losses.  
The results seem to confirm the relative power of the firm’s executives over shareholders.  
Indeed, executives have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to increase their 
 39
annual compensation package, particularly when the annual package heavily depends on 
bonuses based on the firm’s accounting performance, while shareholders have incentives 
to enforce conservative accounting rules to reduce the chances of overpaying the firm’s 
management.   
 
5.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 tests the association between the auditors’ opinion at the time t-1 and 
the level of conditional conservatism at time t.  Moreover, it tests the association between 
auditors’ going concern opinion at time t-1, t, and t+1 and the level of conditional 
conservatism at time t.  The codes that Compustat (DATA149) uses for the auditor 
opinion are: 
0. Financial statements are unaudited  
1. Unqualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect no unresolvable restrictions and 
auditor has no significant exceptions as to the accounting principles, the 
consistency of their application, and the adequacy of information disclosed  
2. Qualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect the effects of some limitation on 
the scope of the examination or some unsatisfactory presentation of financial 
information, but are otherwise presented fairly. We assign this code when a 
company is in the process of liquidating (even if opinion is not actually qualified) 
or when an opinion states that the financial statements do not present fairly the 
financial position of the company  
3. Disclaimer of or No Opinion. Auditor refuses to express an opinion regarding the 
company’s ability to sustain operations as a going concern  
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4. Unqualified Opinion with Explanatory Language. Auditor has expressed an 
unqualified opinion regarding the financial statements but has added explanatory 
language to the auditor’s standard report  
5. Adverse Opinion. Auditor has expressed an adverse opinion.  
Among firms with auditors’ opinion code 4, we find companies that just changed their 
accounting policies from the previous year and companies where auditors qualify their 
opinion with a going concern assumption.  Data about auditors’ opinions qualified with a 
going concern assumption (GCO) come from the Audit Analytics database.  
To test this hypothesis, I adapt Model (1) adding the new variable Code1 to test for 
differences in conditional conservatism for companies who receive a Code 1 (clear) 
auditor opinion with respect to other companies in the sample (Model 4): 
itititititit
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where all the variables are defined above and Code1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
companies that received Code 1 the previous year and zero otherwise.  Indeed, no 
company in the sample reports an auditor opinion Code of 3 or 5. In fact, there are only 4 
observations for companies receiving an audit opinion Code 2 and 7 observations for 
companies with unaudited financial statements (Code 0).  
[Insert Table 5 Panel A about here] 
To test the association between going concern opinions and conditional conservatism, 
I adopt Model (4b): 
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Where all the variables are defined as above and the variable GCOit+j, with data from the 
database Audit Analytics between 2000 and 2005, is equal to 1 if the firm i received a 
going concern opinion from the auditors: (1) one year before (j=-1), (2) the same year 
(j=0), or (3) will receive a going concern opinion the next year (j=+1), zero otherwise.  
[Insert Table 5 Panel B about here] 
Furthermore, I estimate model (5) to assess whether the level of conservatism varies 
with the choice of one of the BigX audit firms vs. smaller audit firms, again introducing 
in Model (1) a variable (BigX) to characterize the companies in the sample with an audit 
opinion from one of the big 4/7 audit firms vs. the other companies.  (Model 5) is: 
itititititit
ititititititititit
NumEstDiffDBigXDBigX
DiffBigXDDiffBigXDiffDPX
654
3210101
***
**/
βββ
ββββαα
+++
+++++=−                     (5) 
where the variables are defined as above and BigX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company was audited the previous year by one of the big 4/7 audit companies, 0 
otherwise.  
[Insert Table 5 Panel C about here] 
I would expect that, after receiving a clear opinion with explanatory language (Code 
4), a company will exhibit a higher conditional conservatism than other companies in the 
sample, to lower the legal liability risk  for the firm’s auditor and managers.  However, it 
should be noted that “better” companies, who received a clear opinion from auditors the 
previous year (Code 1) might already start from a higher level of conditional 
conservatism than companies that receive a clear opinion but with explanatory language.  
In this case, indeed, the auditor acknowledges that something in the firm’s financial 
reporting might raise concerns, and feels the need to explain why.  I would expect, 
furthermore, that companies with aggressive accounting behaviors ( recognizing annual 
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earnings of expected gains faster than losses) would change  to a more rigorous 
accounting conservatism after receiving a going concern opinion from their auditors, to 
reduce the risk of legal liability in case of bankruptcy or default on debt provisions for 
both the auditors and the management.  
Table 5 Panel A reports the results of the estimation of Model (4) for companies that 
received an audit opinion code 1 the previous year. Panel B reports results of the 
estimation of Model (4b) for companies that received an opinion qualified with a going 
concern assumption, and Panel C reports the results for the LAD regression adopting 
Model (5).  Finally, Panel D reports the list of auditors from Compustat with the relative 
number of observations in the sample.  
There is evidence (the coefficient estimate for the interaction coefficient β5 in Model 
(4) is positive and significant at the 10% confidence level) of more timely recognition of 
bad news than good news in reported earnings for companies that received an unqualified 
opinion (Code 1) than for companies that received an unqualified opinion with 
explanatory language.  Again, if I adopt the relative measure of asymmetry and calculate 
the ratio of (β +β1 0)/β0 to measure how much faster bad news is recognized in reported 
annual earning than good news, I find that firms that received a Code 1 audit opinion 
recognize bad news in financial statements 11.6 times faster than good news, while firms 
that received a Code 4 opinion from their auditors recognize bad news in financial 
statements only 3.6 times faster than good news20.  The results are not surprising because 
firms that received a clear audit opinion (Code 1) already exhibit a starting higher level of 
                                                 
20 The value of the ratio of 11.6 for Code 1 companies is, at the 10% level, significantly different for the 
value of the ratio for companies receiving a Code 4 opinion from the auditors. Indeed, if I test for the 
difference between the value of the ratio of 11.6 from a constant value of 3.6, I obtain an F value of 2.94, 
with a p value of 0.0862.  
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conditional conservatism than other firms, as shown when I use the contemporaneous 
auditor opinion variable instead of the lagged value in Model (4) (untabulated results).  
Table 5 Panel B reports the results for the sample of 6,282 firm-year observations, 
from 2000 to 2005, with information from the Audit Analytics database about whether 
the auditors’ opinion has been qualified with the going concern assumption.  Results 
show that companies that in the next year will receive an auditor’s opinion qualified with 
the going concern assumption were less conservative, i.e. more aggressive from an 
accounting point of view, than the rest of the companies in the sample, with a coefficient 
β5 in column (3) negative and statistically significant, equal to –0.007 (T value of 2.06).  
In other words, these companies were recognizing unrealized gains faster than unrealized 
losses in annual earnings.  However, the accounting behavior of these firms changes the 
year they receive a going concern opinion from the auditors (and the year following it) 
with bad news recognized in the annual earnings more quickly than good news (the 
estimate of coefficient β  for column 1 and 2 is positive and highly significant).  5
Table 5 Panel C reports results for companies that hired one of the Big 7 audit firms 
vs. companies that were audited by a smaller audit firm.  Results provide evidence of the 
presence of conditional conservatism.  Companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms 
(the Big 4 plus other three firms) recognize bad news in reported earnings two times 
faster than good news.  Companies who were audited the previous year by one of the Big 
4 audit firms (untabulated results) recognize bad news in reported earnings 6.2 times 
faster than good news.  When I compare the conservative behavior of companies that the 
previous year were audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms vs. smaller audit firms, I find 
strong evidence that companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms are characterized 
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by higher levels of conditional conservatism than companies that were audited by smaller 
firms.  Indeed, the estimate of the interaction coefficient β5 for model (5) is positive and 
statistically significant (0.000247, T value of 2.00).  
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6. Sensitivity Checks 
In this section I will run again a few data analyses to ensure the results in the previous 
section are not dependent on the specific methodology adopted in the dissertation.   
 
6.1 Fiscal Year Return 
I run the Basu model again, calculating returns over the fiscal year instead of for the 
period between nine months before and three months after the fiscal year end.  Model 
(1a) is: 
                (1a) tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDRRDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα
where all the variables are defined as in chapter 4, and Rit-1,t, is the buy-and-hold returns 
of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, 
calculated as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 
the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending at the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the 
stock price at the end of the period, t-j-1.  Results, untabulated, are similar and consistent 
with the results for the Basu model described above in Chapter 4 and tabulated in Table 
2, column (3), (6), and (9).  
 
6.2 Fama-Macbeth Regression 
To check if results presented in the dissertation are dependent on the particular regression 
model adopted (LAD regression),  I run the analysis again adopting a Fama-Macbeth 
regression model, consistent with previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2006; 
Roychowdhury and Watts 2006).  This approach runs an OLS regression for each year 
across the firms in the sample, and averages the estimated regression coefficient over the 
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time series considered.  As expected, since the Fama-Macbeth regression uses an OLS 
approach, results over the one-year horizon (j=0) show a non-significant coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term β1 in Model (1a), consistent with the results tabulated in 
Table 2 column (3).  
 
6.3 Change in the Cut-off Point to Create the Dummy Variable 
One of the problems previous literature (Dietrich et al. 2006) finds in the asymmetric 
timeliness approach to measuring conditional conservatism is that the sub-samples 
good/bad news about future cash flow are not created at the mean value of the proxy 
variable adopted.  In my findings, the mean value for the variable Diff  is –0.96 across the 
sample for the one-year, -1.95 for the two-year, and –2.95 for the three-year time horizon.  
I run the analysis redefining the dummy variable D as D =1 for Diffit-j,t it<–0.96 with j=0, 
D 21=1 for Diffit-j,t it-1,t <–1.95 with j=1, and Dit-2,t=1 for Diff <–2.95 with j=2.it-j,t   When I 
run this analysis, I obtain results qualitatively consistent with the values presented in 
Chapter 4, except for hypothesis 4.  With the new cut-off point, there is no statistical 
difference in the level of conditional conservatism between companies that in the 
previous year have been audited by one of the big 4/7 audit firms and the other 
companies in the sample (interaction coefficient β5 in Model (5) is equal to 0,00002, T 
value equal to 0.2).  
                                                 
21 This new cut-off point does not make, in my opinion, economic sense. When a company received, over 
the two-year period, one more EPS downward forecast revision than upward revision, even if this result is 
better than the average of the value of Diff for all the companies in the sample, it still means that the market 
received one more negative news about the firms future earnings than positive news. It would be a mistake 
to consider that company in the “good news” sample if we stick to the definition of good news as having 
more news about unrealized gains than losses. 
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7. Conclusion and Future Research 
Following Basu’s (1997) seminal work, accounting literature adopted the Basu 
single-period model to measure conditional conservatism.  However, the proxy chosen to 
measure the arrival of good/bad news about firms’ future earnings, the price of the stock, 
can vary due to factors that will never  be recorded in firms’ reported earnings over the 
years.  This unreliability introduces economic and econometric biases into the analysis 
(Dietrich et al. 2006) and causes inaccuracy in the measure of conditional conservatism.   
To overcome the problem, I introduce a new measure of conditional conservatism, 
applying a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression and adopting the 
number of changes in financial analysts’ EPS forecasts as a proxy for good/bad news 
about future earnings.  Then I use this new measure to test the determinants, suggested by 
previous literature, of conditional conservatism in accounting.  Results show that 
companies with (1) lower debt-to-assets ratio, (2) high proportion of executives’ annual 
compensation not depending on the firm’s accounting performance, (3) one of the big 
4/big 7 audit firms as auditor, and a auditor opinion qualified with a going concern 
assumption the previous year exhibit a higher asymmetry in the reporting of news about 
firms’ expected gains/losses in annual earnings. 
Results also confirm the auditor choice as one of the determinants of conditional 
conservatism.  However,  results do not show evidence of an increase in conservatism 
associated with an increase in the firm’s leverage ratio.  Finally, results do not support the 
view of conditional conservatism as an optimal corporate governance mechanism for 
executive compensation.  Indeed, I find that firms with a higher proportion of executive 
compensation depending on the firm’s accounting performance implement aggressive 
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accounting instead of conservative, recognizing unrealized gains more quickly than 
unrealized losses in the firm’s annual earnings report.  
As always, the results are only as good as the variables that I adopt to measure the 
underlying phenomena.  If the variable leverage ratio (Lev) and executive ratio (Exe) are 
able to capture, respectively, the importance of creditors and bond-holders among firms’ 
stakeholders and the firm executives’ incentives to adopt more aggressive accounting 
policies, then we can rule out debt and managerial contractual reasons to explain 
conditional conservatism, in favor of the auditor choice and auditor influence 
determinant.  However, if these variables capture only partially the underlying reality, 
then caution should be used in drawing conclusions from the results of the empirical 
analysis.  It is certain, however, that empirical evidence for the sample adopted shows 
that the auditor influence on clients is a more likely reason for the adoption of higher 
levels of conditional conservatism with respect to debt or compensation contracting 
reasons.  
 
7.1 Future Research 
Future avenues of research include the use of the new measure of conditional 
conservatism to analyze the interaction and the preemptive role of unconditional and 
conditional conservatism, as highlighted in recent literature (Beaver and Ryan 2005; 
Ryan 2006).   
Moreover, the adoption of a different regression model that allows for asymmetric 
loss function should be explored.  Indeed, it is not clear what form of loss function 
investors and financial analysts face.  If, as it might be likely, they are more concerned 
 49
with overestimated than underestimated earnings, then a linear or square loss function 
may not be the appropriate form to use because they both reflect symmetric losses.  How 
to specify a plausible and non arbitrary asymmetric loss function, however, is not clear.  
One possible solution is to follow the method developed first by Elliot (2003), who 
illustrates a general class of asymmetric loss functions nesting the symmetric linear and 
the quadratic loss functions.  With such a general model, which encompasses different 
forms of loss functions, researchers will not be constrained by assumptions about a 
specific functional form, and would be more likely to closely model the complexity of the 
real world.  
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Table 1 Panel A Summary Statistics 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
X/P 17656 1.717104 191.9707 -10.79757 25285.71
X/Pwin 17656 .0366615 .1036586 -.571178 .2420474
Diff 21201 -.9603321 26.24441 -238 204
foreup 21201 15.6253 21.50789 0 245
foredown 21201 16.58563 22.4067 0 278
R 18787 .1263371 .6991903 -1 27.29412
Rwin 18787 .106855 .5175039 -.7849463 2.421277
SALARY 21201 2180.806 18597.96 0 2705195
BONUS 21201 1904.259 3980.28 0 196710.9
SUMOTH 21201  485.5704 4622.145 -111.731 603851.9
Lev 20864 .2331752 .9548152 0 135.25
MB 19989 3.503217 42.40155 -876.9447 5603.074
MktVal 19990 5270.543 18168.66 .0325 467092.9
data6 20963 8971.586 43301.18 0 1291803
data25 20818 136.1432 419.1405 0 10862
 
Where:  
X/Pit, and X/Pwinit (winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values) is the value of earning deflated by 
the beginning of the period market value, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year t, divided by the market value of equity (MktValit  equal to the number of 
share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the difference 
between  the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ 
EPS forecast for firm i over the fiscal period t (from First Call database).  Rit, and Rwinit (winsorized at the 
first and 99th percentile values) is the buy-and-hold annual returns, calculated as the increase in the price of 
stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal end of 
the year, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period 1
1
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−t
t
it P
PR .  SALARYit is the sum 
of the total salary,  BONUSit is the sum of the total bonus, and SUMOTHit is the sum of all other annual 
compensation paid to the executives for firms i in year t.  Levit is the leverage ration and it is calculated as 
Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each year.  MBit is the Market-to-book 
ratio calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided by DATA60. Finally, data6it is the total value of 
assets and data25it is the number of shares outstanding for each company i in year t, from Compustat.  
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Table 1 Panel B Correlation Table  
 
 X/P X/Pwin Diff f_up f_down R Rwin SALARY BONUS SUMOTH Lev MB MktVal data6 data25
X/P 1.000  
   
X/Pwin 0.018 1.000 
 (0.015)  
Diff -0.024 0.207 1.000
 (0.001) (0.000) 
f_up -0.003 0.124 0.575 1.000
 (0.691) (0.000) (0.000)
f_down 0.026 -0.125 -0.619 0.286 1.000
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R 0.002 0.129 0.151 0.054 -0.126 1.000
 (0.797) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rwin 0.003 0.171 0.188 0.076 -0.150 0.871 1.000
 (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SALARY -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.029 0.020 0.001 0.003 1.000
 (0.945) (0.608) (0.341) (0.000) (0.004) (0.859) (0.651)
BONUS -0.003 0.120 0.150 0.301 0.113 0.012 0.022 0.023 1.000
 (0.685) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.003) (0.001)
SUMOTH -0.002 -0.013 -0.009 0.094 0.101 -0.014 -0.013 0.016 0.146 1.000
 (0.803) (0.089) (0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.072) (0.019) (0.000)
Lev -0.006 -0.131 -0.032 -0.006 0.032 -0.015 -0.019 0.000 0.021 0.010 1.000
 (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) (0.046) (0.011) (0.982) (0.002) (0.148)
MB -0.004 -0.027 0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.022 0.029 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 1.000
 (0.626) (0.000) (0.187) (0.193) (0.775) (0.003) (0.000) (0.993) (0.860) (0.748) (0.940)
MktVal 0.006 0.036 0.109 0.339 0.201 -0.021 -0.019 0.023 0.312 0.151 -0.004 0.016 1.000
 (0.453) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.566) (0.024)
data6 0.008 0.068 0.038 0.195 0.143 -0.017 -0.016 0.017 0.484 0.126 0.023 -0.004 0.425 1.000
 (0.268) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.026) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.601) (0.000)
data25 0.010 -0.009 0.033 0.333 0.282 -0.041 -0.046 0.024 0.278 0.157 -0.003 0.009 0.840 0.357 1.000
 (0.172) (0.244) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.692) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000)
 
The table includes Pearson correlation coefficients. Variables are defined as in panel A. 
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Table 2 Hypothesis 1 
 
LAD and OLS: tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDDiffDiffDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα   
and Basu: tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDRRDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα  
 
 (1) LAD j=0 (2) OLS j=0 (3) Basu j=0 (4) LAD j=1 (5)OLS j=1 (6)Basu j=1 (7)LAD j=2 (8)OLS j=2 (9)Basu j=2 
D -0.015904 -0.033642 0.018729 -0.023991 -0.050599 0.036636 -0.025886 -0.056992 -0.006039
 (16.95)** (16.70)** (7.98)** (12.98)** (13.02)** (7.51)** (8.64)** (9.62)** (1.14)
Diff/ [R] 0.000047 0.000374 [-0.005015] 0.000075 0.000350 [-0.018171] 0.000128 0.000346 [-0.009125]
 (1.78) (9.53)** (2.00)* (2.23)* (7.09)** (8.53)** (3.04)** (5.71)** (2.20)*
Diff*D/[R]*D 0.000289 0.000060 [0.201470] 0.000268 0.000259 [0.263361] 0.000260 0.000417 [0.022782]
 (7.31)** (0.82) (21.74)** (5.14)** (2.51)* (17.42)** (3.93)** (3.25)** (2.62)**
NumEst -0.000328 0.000129 0.000174 -0.000437 0.000477 0.000379 -0.000486 0.000622 0.000462
 (3.99)** (0.84) (1.26) (4.64)** (2.72)** (2.19)* (4.42)** (3.17)** (2.39)*
Constant 0.066130 0.053636 0.053705 0.127787 0.098705 0.100208 0.186367 0.141826 0.111801
 (91.81)** (37.13)** (37.32)** (82.41)** (32.72)** (32.08)** (70.51)** (28.70)** (20.03)**
Observations 17656 17656 17646 13548 13548 11995 10302 10302 9062
[Pseudo] R 
Square 
[0.034] 0.059 0.097 [0.025] 0.053 0.066 [0.022] 0.050 0.003
For OLS regression, robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t, 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market 
value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, 
Compustat DATA199).  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-
j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0, 
equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t  is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.  For the OLS models based on Basu 
framework, (model 3, 6, and 9), Rit-j,t, is the buy-and-hold returns of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, 
calculated as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending 3 
months after the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period, t-j-1,  and Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Rit-
j,t<0, equal to zero otherwise.  Columns (1), (2), and (3) report results for the 1 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression.  
Columns (4), (5), and (6) report results for the 2 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression.  Columns (7), (8), and (9) report 
results for the 3 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression.  
 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2  
 
tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDDiffDiffDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα  
 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel A Low Leverage Group Mean Lev=0.0158  
 
 (1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D -0.016892 -0.023323 -0.029246
 (10.55)** (6.21)** (5.93)**
Diff -0.000061 0.000075 0.000060
 (1.39) (1.11) (0.84)
Diff*D  0.000319 0.000110 0.000250
 (4.42)** (0.94) (1.96)*
NumEst -0.000891 -0.001099 -0.001149
 (6.19)** (5.65)** (6.15)**
Constant 0.060561 0.114899 0.168393
 (53.22)** (38.92)** (41.29)**
Observations 4434 3372 2494
Pseudo R Square 0.035 0.023 0.029
 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel B High Leverage Group  Mean Lev=0.5042 
 
 (1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D -0.019893 -0.032671 -0.028973
 (8.90)** (6.60)** (3.06)**
Diff 0.000380 0.000598 0.000699
 (4.81)** (5.32)** (4.37)**
Diff*D 0.000064 -0.000065 -0.000017
 (0.61) (0.43) (0.08)
NumEst -0.000058 0.000308 0.000204
 (0.27) (1.11) (0.53)
Constant 0.065021 0.123288 0.179368
 (35.77)** (28.06)** (20.29)**
Observations 4171 3107 2331
Pseudo R square 0.040 0.039 0.035
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The tables present result of LAD regressions estimated over the 1992-2005 time horizon. The low and high 
leverage groups represent the first (lowest) and the fourth (highest) quartile of firms ranked annually on the 
leverage ratio (Levit-j,t) calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each 
year.  Panel A report the results of the LAD regression for companies in the lowest quartile while panel B report 
the results for companies in the highest quartile.  The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value 
of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 
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99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by 
the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, 
Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199.  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between  
the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS 
forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
Diffit-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t  is the number of analyst that are following the company 
throughout the year.   
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Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel C Method b) 
 
tjittjittjittjittjittjittjittjit
tjittjittjittjittjittjit
NumEstDDiffLevDiffLevDLev
DDiffLevDiffDPX
tjit
,6,,,5,,4,,3
,,2,10,101,1,
****
*/
,
−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−
++++
++++= −
ββββ
βββαα
 
 
 (1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D -0.012102 -0.019229 -0.017313
 (9.87)** (7.72)** (4.00)**
Diff -0.000151 -0.000094 -0.000128
 (4.73)** (2.97)** (2.29)*
Lev 0.007795 0.035253 0.072238
 (2.63)** (5.59)** (6.27)**
Diff*D 0.000455 0.078746 0.000290
 (8.94)** (25.66)** (3.03)**
Lev*D -0.017043 -0.026517 -0.044621
 (4.06)** (2.93)** (2.78)**
Lev*Diff 0.001238 0.001325 0.001658
 (10.35)** (9.26)** (7.72)**
Lev*Diff*D -0.001137 0.000110 -0.000682
 (6.55)** (0.70) (2.02)*
NumEst -0.000381 -0.000512 -0.000550
 (5.34)** (6.75)** (5.65)**
Constant 0.064295 0.127512 0.172233
 (74.51)** (69.10)** (52.45)**
Observations 17541 13404 10175
Pseudo R square 0.038 0.043 0.030
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the 
period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where 
market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times 
price per share, Compustat DATA199.  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward 
(f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i 
between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0, 
equal to zero otherwise.  The leverage ratio (Levit-j,t) is calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided 
by DATA6 for each firm and each year.  For j=1, it’s the average of the leverage ratio over the two-year 
period, and for j=2 it’s the average of the leverage ratio for the company for the three-year period.  
NumEstit-j,t  is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year. 
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Table 4 Hypothesis 3 
 
tjittjittjittjittjittjittjittjit
tjittjittjittjittjittjit
NumEstDDiffExeDiffExeDExe
DDiffExeDiffDPX
tjit
,6,,,5,,4,,3
,,2,10,101,1,
****
*/
,
−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−
++++
++++= −
ββββ
βββαα
 
 
 
(1) LAD j=0 (2) LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2  
D 0.002629 0.003980 0.001075
 (0.80) (0.55) (0.09)
Diff 0.000036 0.000218 0.000406
 (0.52) (2.16)* (3.05)**
Exe -0.054391 -0.114888 -0.073033
 (16.80)** (15.53)** (13.64)**
Diff*D 0.000325 -0.000037 -0.000225
 (2.88)** (0.22) (0.97)
Exe*D -0.020689 -0.035600 -0.016487
 (4.46)** (3.44)** (2.16)*
Exe*Diff -0.000090 -0.000339 -0.000265
 (0.74) (1.94) (2.72)**
Exe*D*Diff -0.000026 0.000504 0.000353
 (0.16) (2.00)* (2.37)*
NumEst -0.000717 -0.000896 -0.001015
 (9.32)** (10.33)** (10.09)**
Constant 0.101810 0.206789 0.307979
 (47.32)** (41.96)** (36.91)**
Observations 17656 13603 10419
Pseudo R square 0.0574 0.0542 0.0623
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the 
period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where 
market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times 
price per share, Compustat DATA199.  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward 
(f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i 
between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit-j,t <0, 
equal to zero otherwise.  The executive ratio (Exeit-j,t) is calculated as ExecuComp SALARY + all other 
annual compensation (SUMOTH), divided by total current compensation (SALARY+BONUS) + all other 
annual compensation (SUMOTH) for each year.  Data are at firm level, as I sum the salary, all other annual 
compensation, and total annual compensation for all the executives in the company for each year.  For j=1, 
it’s the average of the executive ratio over the two-year period, and for j=2 it’s the average of the executive 
ratio for the company for the three-year period.  NumEstit-j,t, finally, is the number of analyst that are 
following the company throughout the year, that I adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher number 
in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts following it, but 
from the number of good/bad news about the company future earnings.  
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel A Audit opinion 
 
itititititit
itititititititit
NumEstDDiffCodeDiffCode
DCodeDDiffCodeDiffDPX
it
6154
132110101
**1*1
*1*1/
βββ
ββββαα
+++
+++++=
−
−−−
 
 
 (1)LAD Code1 vs. Code4 
D -0.015576
 (12.00)**
Diff 0.000119
 (3.35)**
Code1 -0.005365
 (4.45)**
Diff*D 0.000227
 (4.49)**
Code1*D -0.00088
 (0.51)
Code1*Diff -0.000112
 (2.49)**
Code1*D*Diff 0.000105
 (1.65)
NumEst -0.000326
 (4.34)**
Constant 0.069289
 (72.50)**
Observations 17656
Pseudo R Square 0.036
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market 
value for year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of 
equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, 
Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the 
downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call 
database).  Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t, finally, is the 
number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.  
Audit opinion codes are: 
0. Financial statements are unaudited  
1. Unqualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect no unresolvable restrictions and auditor has no 
significant exceptions as to the accounting principles, the consistency of their application, and the 
adequacy of information disclosed  
2. Qualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect the effects of some limitation on the scope of the 
examination or some unsatisfactory presentation of financial information, but are otherwise 
presented fairly. We assign this code when a company is in the process of liquidating (even if 
opinion is not actually qualified) or when an opinion states that the financial statements do not 
present fairly the financial position of the company  
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3. Disclaimer of or No Opinion. Auditor refuses to express an opinion regarding the company’s 
ability to sustain operations as a going concern  
4. Unqualified Opinion With Explanatory Language. Auditor has expressed an unqualified opinion 
regarding the financial statements but has added explanatory language to the auditor’s standard 
report  
5. Adverse Opinion. Auditor has expressed an adverse  
 
Columns (1) reports the results of the LAD regression for companies that received an auditor opinion code 
1 vs. code 4 at time t-1.  No company in the sample report a code equal to 3 or 5, and there are only 4 
observations for companies receiving an audit opinion code 2 and 7 observation for companies with 
unaudited financial statements (code 0).  
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel B Auditors’ Going Concern Opinion 
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  (1) One Year Lag 
(j=-1)
(2) Contemporaneous 
(j=0)
(3) One Year Ahead 
(j=+1)
D -0.017657 -0.017113 -0.017428
 (10.28)** (10.32)** (10.28)**
Diff 0.000115 0.000116 0.000119
 (2.97)** (3.11)** (3.10)**
GCO -0.350510 -0.381728 -0.065795
 (21.88)** (22.32)** (1.56)
Diff*D 0.000127 0.000130 0.000119
 (2.10)* (2.23)* (1.99)*
GCO*D 0.222471 0.023430 -0.300983
 (9.05)** (1.11) (6.71)**
GCO*Diff -0.017224 -0.021131 0.006607
 (20.93)** (3.40)** (1.91)
GCO*Diff*D 0.041935 0.026000 -0.007147
 (27.47)** (4.18)** (2.06)*
NumEst -0.000420 -0.000423 -0.000428
 (3.25)** (3.40)** (3.35)**
Constant 0.061399 0.061391 0.061214
 (46.65)** (48.38)** (47.19)**
Observations 6282 6282 6282
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market 
value for firm i in year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings 
before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market 
value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per 
share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of 
the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call 
database).  Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit, is the number 
of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.  GCOit+j, from the database Audit Analytics 
between 2000 and 2005, is equal to 1 if the firm i received a going concern opinion from the auditors: (1) 
one year before (j=-1), (2) the same year (j=0), or (3) will receive a going concern opinion the next year 
(j=+1), zero otherwise.  
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel C Big7  
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 LAD Big7
D -0.017185
 (20.15)**
Diff 0.000132
 (2.94)**
BigX -0.010895
 (11.35)**
Diff*D 0.000153
 (2.21)*
BigX*Diff -0.000085
 (1.81)
BigX*D 0.002531
 (2.89)**
BigX*D*Diff 0.000147
 (2.00)*
NumEst -0.000322
 (5.05)**
Constant 0.074802
 (78.31)**
Observations 17656
Pseudo R Square 0.039
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where: 
BigX includes the following audit firms: Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers & Lybrand 
Deloitte in the United Kingdom since April 29, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse 
on July 1, 1998), Ernst & Young (Ernst & Whinney from July 1, 1979 to September 29, 1989; Ernst and 
Ernst prior to July 1, 1979), Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte, Haskins & Sells prior to December 4, 1989; 
Haskins & Sells prior to May 1, 1978), Peat, Marwick, Main (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell prior to April 1, 
1987) (known as KPMG internationally), and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Price Waterhouse prior to July 1, 
1998 merger with Coopers & Lybrand). The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by 
the beginning of the period market value for firm i in year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile 
values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market 
value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, 
Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the difference between  the sum 
of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for 
firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call database).  Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diffit <0, equal to zero 
otherwise.  BigX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was audited by one of the big 7 audit firms the 
previous year, 0 otherwise.  NumEstit, finally, is the number of analyst that are following the company 
throughout the year.  Column (1) reports the results of the estimation of the model for companies with one 
of the Big 7 auditors at year t-1 vs. all the other companies in the sample. 
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Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel D Auditors from Compustat DATA149 
 
Code Auditor # Obs. 
0  Unaudited  19 
1  Arthur Andersen  2299 
2  Arthur Young (prior to October 1, 1989) (merged with Ernst & Whinney on October 
1, 1989)  
0 
3  Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte in the United Kingdom since April 
29, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse on July 1, 1998)  
939 
4  Ernst & Young (Ernst & Whinney from July 1, 1979 to September 29, 1989; Ernst and 
Ernst prior to July 1, 1979)  
4232 
5  Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte, Haskins & Sells prior to December 4, 1989; Haskins & 
Sells prior to May 1, 1978)  
2995 
6  Peat, Marwick, Main (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell prior to April 1, 1987) (known as 
KPMG internationally)  
2614 
7  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Price Waterhouse prior to July 1, 1998 merger with 
Coopers & Lybrand)  
3784 
8  Touche Ross (merged with Deloitte, Haskins & Sells on December 4, 1989)  0 
9  Other  115 
10  Altschuler, Melvoin, and Glasser  0 
11  BDO Seidman (Seidman and Seidman prior to September 1, 1988  118 
12  Baird, Kurtz, and Dobson  3 
13  Cherry, Bekaert, and Holland  0 
14  Clarkson, Gordon  0 
15  Clifton, Gunderson  0 
16  Crowe Chizek  0 
17  Grant Thornton  144 
18  J.H. Cohn  0 
19  Kenneth Leventhal  0 
20  Laventhol and Horwath  0 
21  McGladrey & Pullen (McGladrey, Hendrickson, and Pullen prior to May 1988)  19 
22  Moore Stephens  2 
23  Moss Adams  2 
24  Pannell Kerr Forster (Pannell, Kerr, MacGillivray in Canada)  3 
25  Plante and Moran  0 
26  Richard A. Eisner  6 
27  Spicer and Oppenheim  0 
 Missing value 3907 
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